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Problem XII 
CHINA IN THE POST-WAR WORLD 1 
INTRODUCTION 
China's problems in the post-war era will be an intricate 
blend of old and new. When the Sino-Japanese War com-
menced in 1937, China was in a period of transition which 
demanded a fundamental re-examination of many phases of 
her national life. Many old problems, inherent in China's 
evolution, have remained unresolved under the stress of long 
years of war. They will inevitably reappear in the post-war 
period and merge with new issues now taking shape. 
Insight into the questions involved in China's development 
will constitute an important challenge to the United States in 
the years following the war. People in this country are sadly 
lacking at present in a realistic picture of the Chinese nation. 
Formerly the tendency was to expect too little of China ; now, 
the tendency is to expect too much. In the past, we often 
spoke of China as a "weak" and "backward" country and 
compared her to the states of mediaeval Europe. Today, 
swinging the pendulum in the opposite direction, we cling to 
an idealized conception which, through no fault of the Chinese, 
is likely to "let us down" in the course of events. 
The influence of the United States in the international 
f' community cannot fail to be great in the post-war period. 
During and after the peace settlement, many decisions will have 
to be made, and our policies- for better or worse- will have 
a far-reaching effect on China's future . Conversely, China 
has assumed a new position in the Pacific area, a fact which 
will be felt in many ways in the United States. Even aside 
from other considerations, China's growing power for pre-
serving peace in the Far East and the increased economic im-
portance likely to result from her progressive industrialization, 
are developments which are bound to affect our own interests. 
1 This . An alysis has been prepared by Dorothy Rorg, R esearch A ssociate of the 
Am erican Counci1, I nstitute of P acific Relations, who is responsible for any opinions 
expressed . 
BACKGROUND 
The basic problems evident in China before the war fell 
into two categories: those related to foreign affairs and those 
arising out of internal conditions. For many countries the 
cleavage between these two divisions is marked, but China's 
domestic situation has been dominated to an unusual extent 
by her relations with foreign Powers. Her history in recent 
decades is very largely the history of a country trying to 
extricate itself from outside control. 
Through treaties made in the nineteenth century, foreigners 
achieved special privileges in China which cut deeply into 
her national life. Foreign governments obtained control of 
Chinese tariffs which they fixed at approximately 5%. Foreign 
citizens resident in China were given rights of extraterritori-
ality whereby they were tried in law courts conducted by their 
own nationals and subject to the laws of their home countries. 
Parts of certain Chinese cities were set aside as so-called Con-
cessions or Settlements, where foreigners lived under their own 
Administrations. Foreign gunboats moved in Chinese waters 
and foreign troops were stationed on Chinese soil. With the 
exception of the holding of Concessions, the United States 
shared in these arrangements. 
As conditions within China changed, especially during the 
twentieth century, the Chinese became more and more hostile 
to the special position enjoyed by foreigners in their country. 
They not only resented the concrete privileges granted by the 
treaties but came to regard the treaties per se as symbols of 
what they believed to be the arrogant attitude displayed by 
many Westerners toward the Chinese. The foreign communi-
ties in China were themselves divided on this issue and many 
Americans and British accused their fellow-nationals of treat-
ing the Chinese without respect for their national needs or 
their intrinsic dignity as individuals. 
The resentment of the Chinese toward foreigners came to 
a head in the summer of 1925 when an anti-foreign movement 
swept the country, carrying in its wake demonstrations, riots 
and boycotts. This anti-foreign trend was strengthened by the 
growth of the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party. 
Revitalized in 1924 under Dr. Sun Yat-sen with the help of 
Russian advisers, the Kuomintang organized and conducted 
a revolution. The Kuomintang split, but the revolution, 
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nevertheless, engulfed all China and finally resulted in the 
establishment in 1928 of the National Government under 
Chiang Kai-shek. 
From 1925 on, the Chinese Government, reenforced by 
public opinion, insisted upon and obtained a gradual retreat 
of the Powers from their treaty position. The United States, 
which after the Washington Conference was eager to maintain 
the leadership in a progressive policy toward China, showed a 
willingness to meet the Chinese demands for treaty revision at 
least half way. In 1928, it led a movement which resulted 
finally in the return of tariff autonomy to China. At the 
same time the United States and Great Britain started nego-
tiations for the abolition of extraterritorial privileges, nego-
tiations which might have reached a successful conclusion 
if they had not been interrupted by the Manchurian Crisis in 
1931. Following this, little was done until 1943, when both 
the United States and Great Britain signed treaties with China 
which virtually wiped out the special privileges held by their 
citizens up to this time. 
Alongside of the struggle for a revision of the treaties, the 
Chinese had many other causes for disputes with foreigners. 
One need only recall the wars fought with and over China, the 
battle for concessions, the scramble for spheres of influence, 
to realize that China has been one of the great passive battle-
grounds over which the Powers have tried to outmaneuver each 
other. Insight into these phases of China's relations with other 
nations is essential not only to an understanding of history 
but also to an understanding of post-war China. Chinese 
resentment against foreigners was justified in the past and it 
cannot be dissipated overnight. At the peace table and in 
the post-war years, China may be moved, perhaps uncon-
sciously, to seek some compensation for all she has undergone. 
Indicative of this attitude are the remarks of T. S. Chien :2 
"She will insist on meticulous equality of treatment in her 
dealings with other nations. She will be jealously watchful 
of her full sovereignty and freedom of action. The older 
nations may be ready to accept a degree of international gov-
ernment and restricted sovereignty; the new Chinese nation 
may behave chauvinistically." 
To this he adds that China "will come to the peace table 
young and perhaps with a chip on her shoulder." 
• "New China's Demands." Foreign Affairs, July 1948, p. 690·8. 
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In their attitude toward China's conduct of her foreign 
relations in the post-war years, Americans should therefore 
have in mind the direct bearing of the past on the present. In 
addition, they should have a realistic picture of the situation 
now existing within China. Although it is obviously impos-
sible to review here all the elements that make up modern 
China, there are some basic considerations that may serve as 
guides to the future. 
China is essentially an agricultural country and her problems 
are primarily agricultural problems. At least three-quarters 
of her population is agricultural and her peasants are stagger-
ing under an appalling burden of poverty; testimony to this 
lies on every hand. 
Small and scattered land holdings, rents, taxes, and credit 
are among the peasant's most crucial problems. While lack 
of data makes any accurate picture impossible, it appears that 
in North China the averaae farm is no larger than two to eight 
acres, while in the south it is only about one acre. Accord-
ing to one rough estimate, the landlords who form about 5% 
of the population, own approximately half of the cultivated 
land, while the peasants who constitute about 70% of the 
population, own only 20o/o of the land. Moreover, individual 
farms are so divided that one man's farm consists "of any-
thing from 5 to 40 scattered squares, oblong , strips, wedaes 
and corners of land, scattered over hedgeless fields and some-
times at a distance of more than a mile from each other."3 
In addition to the pitiful smallness and fragmentation of 
farms, the peasant has to face heavy burdens of rent and 
taxes. Rents are estimated as taking commonly from SO% 
to 60% of the harvest, and sometimes as much as 80%. Taxes 
are heavy, consisting of land taxes, surtaxes and extra char~es 
of varying kinds. Moreover, the system of tax collection 
throws an unfair share of the burden on the peasant. The tax 
collector is usually a local official who has obtained his job 
through heredity and who uses all the techniques of "squeeze" 
-so familiar in China-that he has learned from his fore-
fathers. Unfortunately, these techniques are more easily 
employed against the poor farmer than against his more pow~r­
ful neighbor, the landlord, so that the latter is likely to escape 
responsibility at the expense of the former. 
As a result of these overwhelming difficulties, the peasant 
a R. H. Tawney, Land and Labor in China, p. 89 , 
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is constantly in need of money. Rough estimates, made before 
the war, indicate that the minimum annual sum needed to 
support a peasant family in China was about Ch. $150 and it 
is probable that a large portion of the population fell below 
even this standard. Under these circumstances there is little 
the farmer can do except borrow money. This he does-maybe 
from his landlord who is often the local money lender-at 
exorbitant rates of interest. R. H. Tawney states that "a 
'good money-lender' described as a blessing to his village has 
been known to charge only 25%; but such restraint is excep-
tional."4 Interest is said to range between 20% and 60% 
and often goes much higher. The consequence is that a farmer 
who has once fallen into debt is usually unable to meet his ex-
penses and pay his commitments to the money lender and thus 
is caught more and more in a vicious spiral of borrowing. 
This (the agrarian issue) is China's number one problem-
past, present and future. A criticism frequently levelled 
against the National Government is that it has done little to 
ameliorate these conditions. Moreover, the war itself is said 
to have made the situation even more acute. In pushing Free 
China back into the western provinces, it has wiped out the 
influence of the manufacturers, traders and others who had 
been engaged in modern enterprise and were, in many respects, 
progressive in outlook. These groups tended to counterbal-
ance the power of the landlord class which, now, without their 
restraining influence, is in an even better position than for-
merly to oppose agrarian reforms. What effect this will have 
on post-war developments remains to be seen. 
Industrially, China is often compared to Europe on the 
eve of the Industrial Revolution. Work in cottages and work-
shops is the rule rather than the exception. Weaving, the 
making of clothes and shoes, the fashioning of furniture, metal 
work, wood work, and an infinite variety of other trades are 
carried on in small workships by little bands of workers. Side 
by side with this situation, there has grown up within the last 
half century a more modernized industrial system, largely con-
fined, however, to the treaty ports and developed very 
largely under foreign control. Although, especially in the 
years before the war, there was a rapid increase in industrial 
activity, China industrially is still far from comparable to the 
modernized countries of Europe or to the United States. In 
• Op. cit., p. 62. 
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pre-war days, while there were some large factories in China-
notably in the textile trade-the average plant had no more 
than 200 employees, and it was estimated that all-in-all there 
were probably no more than two million factory workers 
throughout the country. 
When the National Government came into power, it was 
well aware of the necessity of "modernizing" China, of build-
ing the blood and tissues of a modern state. The pace of 
industrialization was accelerated. Much emphasis was placed 
on the building of a transportation system, and within ten 
years roadway suitable for motor traffic was increased from 
15,000 to 100,000 kilometers. While less progress was made 
in respect to railroads, several thousand miles of tracks were 
laid. Nevertheless in 1935 China possessed only 9,737 miles 
of railways as compared to 254,000 miles in the United States. 
In addition to these and similar measures, work was also 
undertaken by the National Government in such fields as pub-
lic health and education. In education, China has given most 
attention to her primary schools. The number of primary 
school children was increased by several millions before the 
war, and secondary schools were improved in quantity and 
quality. . 
One of the difficulties, however, with industrialization, estab-
lishment of communications, and other pre-war developments 
in China, was that they took place largely in the eastern 
provinces. Therefore, when Free China was forced to retreat 
to the hinterland as a result of the Japanese invasion, she was 
faced with the necessity of opening up a largely undeveloped 
West. Throughout the war, rapid strides have been made 
in constructing highways, railroads, factories, etc., and the 
interior of China presents a very different aspect today from 
that offered before 193 7. While this transformation should not 
be exaggerated, it nevertheless carries with it great potenti-
alities for the future. 
Out of China's background, therefore, emerge certain fac-
tors, such as her changing relations with foreign Powers, the 
magnitude of her agrarian problem, the early stages of her in-
dustrialization, and modernization in certain other spheres of 
national life, which mark the starting point from which China 
must set out on her post-war journey. In these terms, and 
only in these terms, is it possible to understand the issues 
involved in the future of Sino-American relations. 
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ANALYSIS 
1. What does China want from the peace settlement and 
how jar are her views likely to coincide with those of the 
United States? 
No official statement has as yet been made, indicating the 
nature of the peace terms China is likely to demand. Never-
theless, by gathering together views obtained from responsible 
sources, it is possible to gain an idea of the attitude of the 
Chinese toward the peace settlement as a whole and toward 
some of the terms under consideration. 
a. What is the general attitude toward Japan likely to be 
in both China and the United Statess after the war? 
China and the United States will be among the leading 
nations to effect a peace settlement with Japan. The ques-
tion, therefore, of the attitude these countries will adopt in 
approaching the peace negotiations is one of major importance. 
Some Chinese argue in favor of moderation, affirming that 
while Japan should be stripped of the power to commit further 
acts of aggression, she should not be transformed into a ruined, 
bankrupt, and revengeful neighbor. There are indications, 
however, of a tendency within China to emphasize Japan's 
past record of aggression and to insist that the character of 
the Japanese people makes it impossible to use generous 
methods. This line of reasoning is followed, for example, by 
S. R. Chow in his recent book, Winning the Peace in the 
Pacific,:; an expression of an important Chinese point of view: 
"A big stick counts with them (the Japanese) more than lofty 
principles, good faith, and soft words. It is a mistake to 
think that one could make the Japanese quiet, reasonable, or 
peace-loving by treating them generously after the war."6 
Dr. Chow's views seem to be paralleled in the United States. 
The Denver National Opinion Research Center states that 
American hostility to Japan is intense; that it exceeds the 
bitterness felt toward Germany; and that it has increased 
markedly since the outbreak of the war. There seems little 
doubt that antagonism to Japan in this country is great and 
is growing greater. 
• Dr. Chow's book has been drawn on extensively in the preparation of thi~ section 
of the Ana lysis . 
• p. 11. 
I 
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b. What Chinese proposals have been made in respect to 
specific peace terms? To what extent should we be prepared 
to meet these demands? 
Some of the points noted below have already been analyzed 
in Problem XI from the point of view of arguments offered 
for and against their acceptance by the United States. The 
following summary of Chinese proposals has been taken from 
different sources, some official, some unofficial. It seems evi-
dent that the United States should not reach a final decision 
concerning the terms of the peace settlement, without giving 
the fullest consideration to the demands of the Chinese. The 
extent to which Chinese interests are involved in the settle-
ment can be seen from such facts as the following: ( 1) Many 
of the issues in respect to a territorial settlement in the Pacific 
relate to former Chinese territory. (2) The consequences of 
militarism in Japan have been felt by China more than by any 
other country. (3) Japanese disarmament is as vital an issue 
to China, as German disarmament was to France after the 
last World War. (4) Many suggestions in regard to repara-
tions involve the transfer of property to China. 
Because of China's stake in the peace settlement, it is sug-
gested that some of the questions already discussed under 
Problem XI be reviewed in the light of the following Chinese 
recommendations, with a view to ascertaining to what extent 
we are prepared to join with China in her demands. 
(1) Territorial settlement. 
The Cairo Declaration oi President Roosevelt, Generalissimo 
Chiang, and Prime Minister Churchill announced that Japan 
would be "stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which 
she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first 
World War in 1914"; that all the territories "stolen" from 
China "such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores" 
would be restored to the Chinese; that Japan would "be ex-
pelled from all other territories which she has taken by vio-
lence and greed"; that Korea should "in due course" become 
free and independent." ' 
This proposed territorial adjustment met the demands which 
had previously been stated unofficially on many occasions 
by the Chinese. The extent to which Chinese aspirations were 
satisfied at Cairo is reflected in reports that Chungking was 
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"jubilant" on receiving the news of the Declaration and hailed 
the settlement as China's "political and diplomatic victory." 
China, the United States, and Great Britain have thus 
agreed on the territorial questions at issue between China 
and Japan. The Chinese, however, repeatedly bring up the 
problem of Hongkong as a matter to be settled between them-
selves and the British. They want an immediate return of 
Hongkong "without strings attached". It is suggested that 
the British may prefer to treat this question as part of an 
over-all settlement in the Pacific area, dealing not only with 
China but with all the countries bordering on the Pacific. 
In this case the United States would be among those having 
to reach a decision concerning the future of Hongkong. The 
suggestion has been made by some Englishmen that Hongkong 
might be used as a base for an international police force. The 
Chinese, however, emphasize the vital importance of Hong-
kong to their own country as a great commercial center for 
South China. Compromise plans have been put forward, 
recommending that Hongkong be ruled for a brief period by 
an Anglo-Chinese administration, prior to its unconditional 
return to China. In addition to the above arguments there 
are many who believe that Great Britain should relinquish 
Hongkong immediately, before Chinese resentment has piled 
up to such an extent that it will be impossible to allay ill 
feeling. 
(2) Reform of the Japanese Government. 
On January 1, 1944, the Generalissimo delivered a speech 
in which he stated that the Japanese militarists must be "wiped 
out" and the Japanese political system purged of all aggressive 
elements. He added: "As to what form of government Japan 
should adopt, that question can better be left to the awakened 
and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves." The 
Generalissimo further referred to a possible revolution in 
Japan, which would overthrow the militarist regime, in which 
case, be said, we should respect the "spontaneous will" of the 
Japanese people and "allow them to choose their own form of 
government." Failing a revolution, however, other Chinese 
have suggested that the United Nations should exert "irresis-
tible external pressure" 7 to force the present Japanese Gov-
ernment out of power and strengthen the bands of the liberal 
' S. R. Chow, op. cit., p. 21. 
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elements. It is urged that one means of pursuing such a policy 
would be to refuse to deal with the present Japanese adminis-
tration or any other militarist faction in concluding the peace 
settlement. 
(3) Disarmament of Japan. 
In regard to the disarmament of Japan, unofficial Chinese 
proposals support the following measures: 
(a) The United Nations should take over all Japanese air-
craft, military and non-military, and Japan's air bases should 
be demolished. 
(b) Japan should be deprived of her navy, naval bases, and 
shipbuilding yards for naval vessels. 
(c) Japan should not be allowed to maintain a national 
army. 
(d) Armament factories should be confiscated; the import 
of arms into Japan should be prohibited and the import of 
strategic raw materials controlled. 
(e) An International Commission, with agencies on the spot, 
should ensure the enforcement of the disarmament clauses of 
the treaty. It is argued by some Chinese that prolonged 
supervision by such a Commission is essential; that Western 
experts underestimate Japan's will and capacity for renewed 
aggression; that the impracticability of prolonged control 
has been unduly exaggerated. 
( 4) Reparations. 
Financial reparations, such as followed the last World War, 
appear to be regarded as impractical in China. Reparation 
demands center around two main proposals. (a) It is pro-
posed that Japan should be made to surrender in favor of 
China all her investments, properties and material assets 
(whether state-owned or not) in all of China including Man-
churia. This is obviously a vital question from the Chinese 
point of view, as Manchuria is expected to play a key role 
in the post-war industrialization of China. (b) The sugges-
tion is made by Chinese-and by others as well-that a con-
siderable part of Japan's machinery for heavy industry be 
transported to China in order to help in the reconstruction of 
China, in order to prevent Japan's rebuilding her armament 
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industry, and as just retribution for the Japanese attack on 
China. 
In conclusion it may be said that the main differences of 
opinion between Chinese and Americans in relation to the 
proposed peace terms which have appeared to date seem to 
relate to the amount of economic freedom to be given Japan. 
This issue hinges in turn on the question of whether or not 
liberal elements will control the Japanese government after 
the war. Should this be the case, it is believed by many 
thoughtful observers that the Chinese would alter their views 
concerning such matters as the removal of Japan's indus-
trial equipment to China. (For arguments against the destruc-
tion of Japanese industry, see "What Future for Japan?" by 
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Foreign Policy Reports, September 1, 
1943.) 
2. What role should the United States play in China's post-
war industrialization? 
China is grimly determined to speed up the pace of her 
industrialization after the war. Even for a country where 
paper plans always flourish in abundance, China is today 
producing an astonishing number of plans for postwar indus-
trialization. Every government ministry is formulating pro-
grams; official and unofficial planning conferences have been 
held; and the Generalissimo himself in his famous book 
China's Destiny (issued in China last spring but not yet 
released abroad) has set forth "masses of figures" to be 
achieved both on a ten year schedule and in longer periods. 
The objectives cover such matters as an increase in the out-
put of iron, coal and steel; the production of machinery, loco-
motives, automobiles, steamships, etc.; the expansion of light 
industries; and the further development of export commodities. 
a. What stake has the United States in the post-war indus-
trialization of China ? 
It is argued that the aims of Chinese industrialization are 
by no means of interest to China alone. Looking back over 
modern history it is clear that China- with important 
resources and a potential market of 400 million customers 
-has been an inevitable cause of conflict among the Powers 
for advantages, exploitation and conquest. Many feel that 
there will be no end to this struggle until China is strong, 
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strong enough to defend herself. Only a self-dependent and 
vigorous China, it is said, can bring peace to the Far East. 
A prerequisite of China's strength is economic power and 
for this reason, if for no other, the United States should regard 
China's industrialization as essential. 
In addition, however, there are those who consider that the 
industrialization of China may help the United States, Great 
Britain and other nations in the solution of some of their own 
economic problems. Post-war China, it is stated, should be 
able to absorb idle American capital and furnish a market for 
foreign goods. Sceptics point out that China has, for the 
last hundred years, been regarded as the coming El Dorado 
of the American trader, but that this dream has never ap-
proached realization. The answer given by some to this criti-
cism is that the Chinese cannot buy consumers' goods in large 
quantities while they remain a nation of poverty-stricken 
peasants. In this connection, emphasis is placed on the bene-
fits that should accrue from industrial progress. During the 
period of China's industrialization, her import demands will be 
primarily for capital goods, while over a longer period of 
time, as the experience of the past has shown, the industrializa-
tion of China will mean greatly increased and varied foreign 
trade, and will contribute considerably to the maintenance of 
a prosperous world economy. 
b. On what terms should the United States participate in 
Chinese post-war industrialization? 
In the years immediately after the war, some economists 
believe, China may find it more difficult to obtain capital goods 
than funds. The blockade, they point out, has made it im-
possible for China to make use of either the $500 million loan 
granted by the United States in 1942, or the money. which is 
accumulating through the remittances of overseas Chinese 
and through foreign expenditures in China. When the war is 
over, China will presumably have this money for immediate 
use. 
It is assumed, nevertheless, that in the long run China will 
need funds, goods and technicians. The Chinese claim, how-
ever, that no matter how great the need, they will not accept 
foreign assistance on the old terms. Loans were formerly guar-
anteed, for example by the customs revenues, and to ensure 
the proper collection of these revenues foreigners were ·placed 
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in charge of the Customs Administration. Foreign business 
was conducted, to a large extent, within the sheltering walls of 
Concessions, free from taxes and other forms of Chinese juris-
diction. Foreign advisers often acted, not as servants of the 
Chinese Government, but in a partially independent capacity, 
serving also the interests of foreign Powers. Conditions such 
as these caused much resentment and were referred to as fac-
tors reducing China to a "semi-colonial status." Moreover, 
it was felt that foreign business, enjoying special privileges, 
was able to smother China's infant industries by unfair com-
petition. The fact that much of China's industrial develop-
ment was taking place under foreign control also led to the 
feeling that policies were instituted in a haphazard fashion 
which might result in profits for individual firms but which 
took little account of Chinese economy as a whole. 
It is with this experience in mind that Chinese are insist-
ing today that if foreign aid is offered only on the old terms, 
they would prefer to raise capital within their own country. 
No one underestimates the hardships this would entail, but 
China, above all nations, has shown her capacity to endure 
suffering. Besides privation, any such course would probably 
mean retarding, to a serious extent, the pace of Chinese indus-
trial development. Moreover it must be remembered that 
experience has shown that economic isolation means rigid state 
planning under authoritarian control. 
(1) Loans. 
If China requires further loans from the United States, 
should they be made from government or private sources? 
On the one hand, it is argued that private capital is less 
politically "explosive" and would therefore be more acceptable 
to the Chinese. On the other hand, grave doubts are expressed 
as to whether private capital will be willing to take any such 
risks without guarantees of security and high returns. The 
loans floated in this country after the last World War, in rela-
tion to Europe and South America, are cited for their disas-
trous consequences and it is intimated that the American 
public is not likely to want to repeat this experience. It is 
suggested that government loans, whether made directly be-
tween Washington and Chungking or through some interna-
tional agency acting as intermediary, will probably be used 
extensively following World War H. 
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Whether private or public loans are made, however, it will 
be necessary to consider certain basic facts. There is nothing 
to be gained and much to be lost, it is felt, by viewing con-
ditions through rose-colored glasses. Chinese inflation has now 
reached appalling proportions and both Chinese and Ameri-
cans recognize that this situation must be remedied if foreign 
capital is to find its way into China. Political stability is 
another prerequisite of foreign loans. There is no use blink-
ing the fact that lack of political unity has been a critical 
problem in modern China. In the decade before the National 
Government was established, China was torn by struggles 
between warlords. Even after the advent of the Chiang 
Kai-shek regime, conflicts between the central government 
and local factions continued and a long and bitter war was 
fought with the Communists. Whether these difficulties will 
be resolved in the post-war era is a question which remains 
to be decided. 
There are other issues, hard to define in black-and-white, 
but still of importance when considering post-war loans to 
China. In Western terms, China is still a long way from being 
modernized, especially as far as her industrial structure is 
concerned. Moreover, modernization entails a long and diffi-
cult experience by means of which China must develop the 
particular form of economy best suited to her needs. As Pro-
fessor ]. B. Condliffe has stated : "China cannot be turned 
overnight into a mechanically minded, industrial community. 
It is too easy a solution to believe that economic development 
can be achieved simply by transplanting some of the mechani-
cal tricks and tools of the West. These tricks and tools are 
the tangible results of a long and painful process of scientific 
application. The fundamental principles of which they are 
applications need to be applied in new ways to the different 
problems of China."S 
These conditions suggest a post-war period of trial-and-error 
which may entail considerable confusion. Moreover, certain 
administrative features must be taken into account. One of 
these is "squeeze", which though commonly practiced both in 
political administration and the conduct of business in China, 
has proved a stumbling block in many phases of her national 
life. 
• J. B. Condliffe, " The I ndustrial Department of China" in NaticmaJ Reconstructio,., 
April , 1943. 
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Reviewing all these considerations concerning the post-war 
industrialization of China, it is suggested that the assump-
tion be made that in the immediate post-war period, loans 
granted to China will be on an inter-governmental basis. The 
questions that derive from this are: How can these loans be 
made without returning to the old pernicious practice of 
infringing China's sovereignty? On what terms can loans be 
negotiated that will safeguard United States' interests? 
(2) Foreign enterprise in China. 
While some of the above considerations apply to the carry-
ing on of foreign business (industrial, financial and commer-
cial) in China, some special problems are also present in this 
connection. Americans will face a new situation in having 
to conduct their business affairs without the benefit of extra-
territorial privileges. Those who believe that this should 
offer no difficulties point to the fact that Germans and Rus-
sians have, long since, ceased to enjoy extraterritorial rights; 
that, in the hinterland, foreigners have depended little on 
extraterritoriality; that some of the larger American and 
British companies have incorporated under Chinese law in the 
past. 
On the other hand it is argued that, inherent in the new 
situation, are many unknown factors that will determine the 
future role of foreign enterprise in China. Possibly foremost 
among these is the attitude-still undecided- that the Chinese 
will adopt. There are those who are convinced that the need 
for assistance will result in China's welcoming foreign enter-
prise. Counterbalancing this theory, however, is the fact 
that the Chinese Government probably will want to maintain 
control of heavy industry itself and to promote Chinese enter-
prise in light industry. Today there are indications of the 
existence of both these trends. In September 1943, a resolu-
tion passed by the Central Executive Committee and Super-
visory Committee of the Kuomintang lifted the restriction 
which limited the ratio of foreign capital in Sino-foreign enter-
prises to 49%; the same resolution also declared that all other 
regulations governing ·such enterprise "shall be revised." 
While this suggests that the Chinese will welcome foreign 
business activity, a different tone has been adopted in pro-
posals made by some Chinese economists. A list of these 
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published in an article by C. W. Meng9 includes: (a) The 
period of existence of foreign factories in China shall be 
decided by the National Government. Upon the expiration 
of the period, the _rational Government may take over the 
factory with compensation, or may order the cessation of 
operations within a limited period. (b) Exemption from taxes, 
which may be specially permitted to Chinese factories as 
encouragement to the development of domestic industries, 
shall not be applicable to foreign factories. (c) All staff mem-
bers and laborers of foreign factories in China shall be Chinese. 
If it is necessary to employ foreign technicians, their employ-
ment shall be reported to the Chinese authorities for approval. 
In view of the foregoing, there are, despite the many uncer-
tainties involved, some basic questions which it is well to ask 
at the present: What role can foreign enterprise play in post-
war China that will be helpful and not harmful to Chinese 
development? How can foreign enterprise conform to the 
requirements and the interests of the Chinese people and still 
further its own legitimate aims? 
c. What form shall China's post-war industrialization take 
and how is this 1·elated to United States interest and policy? 
(1) Heavy vs. light industry? 
Among the most discussed problems of post-war industri-
alization in China is the question of whether to emphasize 
heavy or light industry. Many economists insist that the logi-
cal procedure would be to concentrate on light industry at the 
outset. This, they recall, was the method followed by such 
highly mechanized nations as Great Britain and the United 
States. Moreover, they believe such a choice would be con-
sistent with the present state of Chinese economy which is 
based on small units of production. Also, they point out that 
light industry requires less capital and that after China has 
accumulated funds through the sale of consumers' goods, she 
will be in a better position to afford the development of her 
heavy industries. 
Others disagree with this approach for several reasons. A 
nation can achieve economic independence, even in relative 
terms, they say, only through the establishment of basic indus-
tries. Moreover they are convinced that China can not afford 
the luxury of concentrating on the production of consumers' 
o Far Eastern Survt:y, Nov. S, 1948. 
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goods, when at any moment she may need armaments. In 
this connection, they assert that the form of Chinese indus-
trialization will depend to a considerable extent on the type 
of peace settlement that is made and how much security 
China derives from it. 
While the above arguments are heard frequently, it should 
be remembered that there is still a third possibility, namely, 
the development of both light and heavy industry at approxi-
mately parallel rates. 
(2) Government vs. private control? 
Closely linked with the debate concerning light and heavy 
industry is the discussion concerning government and private 
control. During the war, the government's hold has been 
extending itself more and more over the entire system of 
Chinese economy. The war seriously undermined the existence 
of private modern banks, with the result that the government 
has gained control of the banking system. Foreign trade is 
under government direction and most of the heavy industries 
are government owned. 
Those who argue that this process of centralization should 
continue after the war say that all strategic industries ought, 
for defense reasons, to be state owned; that if the pace of 
China's industrialization is to be accelerated, the govern-
ment alone has the power to do so; that private capital will 
not have the means either to establish or conduct many of the 
essential enterprises. 
On the opposite side, the argument is advanced that govern-
ment control over the economic structure of a country means 
placing the resources and the power in the hands of a small 
group of people. While many object in general terms, there 
are also those who object on the specific grounds that this is 
what is taking place at the moment and that to continue the 
present policy merely means strengthening the more con-
servative elements of the Chungking government. People 
who hold this view are likely to maintain in addition that, in 
developing a country, free enterprise usually stimulates pro-
duction and provides a check on bureaucracy. 
Which policy will gain the upper hand remains to be seen, 
but here too it should be pointed out that government and 
private enterprise may develop side by side. This is in fact 
the tendency at the moment, with the government taking over 
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heavy industries and allowing private capital, where it is 
capable of doing so, to engage in light industries. 
(3) What is the interest of the United States ? 
The form that industrialization takes in China will inevi-
tably affect her economic relations with the United States. 
The amount and nature of the loans China will require, the 
quantity and type of goods that she will buy and sell abroad, 
the opportunities left open for foreign enterprise--questions 
such as these will be determined to a large extent by decisions 
made in respect to the development of heavy and light indus-
tries and the establishment of government and private control. 
Moreover, the interrelationship between industrialization 
and the improvement of agricultural conditions in China is 
constantly being emphasized. Many point out that indus-
trialization is not an isolated phase of the economic life of a 
country but must be considered in relation to the whole. The 
"China market", so long spoken of by Americans, can never 
materialize while China's "400 million customers" have no 
purchasing power with which to buy. 
3. How should the United States shape her policies toward 
post-war China in the political sphere ? 
a. What problems are likely to arise concerning the policy 
of dealing with China as a "great" Power? How should the 
United States meet these? 
At times during the war, the Chinese have felt that they 
were receiving insufficient recognition from the United States 
and Great Britain in the planning of United Nations' strategy. 
This has been due to their lack of representation in certain 
administrative boards and conferences, and also to the fact 
that relatively little military assistance has been given China 
to date and that a large proportion of the Allied emphasis has 
been put on the war in the Atlantic at the expense-in the 
Chinese view-of the Pacific area. The participation of China 
in the Cairo Conference and the Moscow Declaration served, 
however, to dissipate much ill-feeling. The extent to which 
this participation has pleased the Chinese can be seen in a 
statement made by the Chinese News Service shortly after 
the Cairo meeting: 
"China became one of the 'big four ' that signed the Moscow 
Declaration. Now at the Cairo Conference, China was ac-
19 
corded the position of one of the 'big three' in the Pacific 
war. It is indeed a far cry from the China of unequal treaties, 
the China of Settlements and Concessions, the China of fears 
and anxieties, to the new and vigorous China of today, the 
China that is taking a prominent position in the councils of 
great Powers .... " 
According to reports, the United States Government is 
emphasizing the necessity of giving China a leading role 
among the United Nations, on an equal footing with Great 
Britain, Russia, and the United States. As far as the post-
war period is concerned, it is evident that this policy will 
be put to the test by having to meet many concrete problems. 
The extent to which Chinese wishes will be respected in the 
peace settlement is a case in point. If an international 
organization is set up after the war, there will be many ques-
tions to decide such as the number of votes to be accorded 
each of the member states and which nations should be repre-
sented on the various governing bodies. If an international 
police force is created, it will be necessary to allocate responsi-
bilities to all the participating countries. In looking ahead to 
situations such as these, it is well to consider what the policy 
of the United States ought to be. 
b. What policy should the United States adopt toward politi-
cal problems which may arise in post-war China such as 
(1) political unity, ( 2) the strengthening of democracy? 
The questions raised below concern the shape of American 
policy in respect to certain specific domestic problems that 
may arise in post-war China. This part of the Analysis might 
well be considered, however, in relation to the more general 
issues of (a) the means, if any, by which one government is 
justified in influencing the internal conditions of another, 
(b) the extent to which such influence may justifiably be car-
ried. The key position which the United States, due to its 
wealth and power, will inevitably occupy in the post-war 
period make it essential to face these issues squarely. 
( 1) Political unity. 
It has been extremely difficult for modern China to main-
tain political unity. Even after the time of the warlords there 
still remained, in the period 1928-37, many local leaders who 
governed in their special areas on a virtually autonomous 
basis. In addition, there have been national parties, one of 
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which, the Kuomintang, bas ruled China since 1928 on a 
one-party system. The strongest group opposing the Kuomin-
tang has been the Communists. There were--and are--bow-
ever, other parties which though far less well-known have 
played a not unimportant role in China. 
After the establishment of the National Government, Chiang 
Kai-sbek waged a bitter war against the Communists for ten 
years. Finally in 193 7, the Kuomintang and Communists 
agreed to set aside their differences and join in a United Front 
in order to withstand the Japanese invasion. Following this, 
the Communists who live in the so-called Border Region in 
the northwest, sent their troops (the famous Eighth Route 
and New Fourth armies) to mobilize the population and con-
duct guerilla warfare behind and between the Japanese lines 
in north and central China. In the areas which thus came 
under their control, the Communists introduced more popular 
governmental procedures and agrarian reforms. 
The Central Government has objected to these Communist 
activities on the ground that the Communists were trying to 
"run their own show" by supporting an independent adminis-
tration and military force and by pursuing their own policies. 
The Communists, on the other hand, have accused Chungking 
of maintaining a military blockade around the Border Region 
and of using repressive measures which they feel makes it 
impossible for them to relinquish their independence with 
safety. One cost of the strained relations between the Kuo-
mintang and the Communists has been the frequent recur-
rence of crises, carrying with them serious threats of civil war. 
Civil war, it is evident, would affect not only China but all 
the United Nations. For this reason, the United States bas, 
indirectly, been drawn into the Kuomintang-Communist con-
troversy. While nothing was definitely known in the past, 
there were those who felt that the State Department, backed 
by the power derived from the control of credits and Lend-
Lease assistance, was using its influence to avoid civil war in 
China. Left-wing groups on the other band, charged that 
officials in Washington were telling Chungking that it must 
continue to fight the Communists if it wished to maintain its 
friendship with the United States. This charge, made pub-
licly by Earl Browder, moved Sumner Welles, then Under 
Secretary of State, to make a significant statement of Ameri-
can policy which read in part: 
21 
"With regard to the specific charge that 'the State Depart-,_ 
ment in Washington has informed Chungking's representa-
tives that our Government would be displeased if complete 
unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and 
the Communists', what this statement alleges is the exact 
opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington 
has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic con-
texts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete 
unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organiza-
tions thereof".l o 
Mr. Welles concluded by saying that "this Government" 
desires unity within China and within all countries of the 
United Nations group not only for the sake of the conduct 
of the war but also for the "creation and maintenance of con-
ditions of just peace." 
The importance of the Kuomintang-Communist controversy 
to post-war America was stressed also in a broadcast made last 
August by Raymond Gram Swing: 
"While it is undeniable that this (i.e. the Kuomintang-Com-
munist problem) is an internal affair of the Chinese, it is not 
one that China's allies can ignore, while the war is in progress. 
Nor will this country be able to ignore it after the war is 
over. The Chinese people have all the sympathy of this 
country, and deserve it. They will need American loans and 
equipment after the war. Their place as a power and their 
leadership for stability and development must be assured. 
So long as the United States has Pacific responsibilities what 
happens in China will affect us .... " 11 
In discussing whether, if serious political friction persists 
in China, United States' policy should continue to follow the 
lines indicated in Mr. Welles' statement, it is well to remember 
that the principle enunciated by Mr. Welles has been set 
forth on a number of occasions by previous administrations 
in Washington. The United States was, for example, the first 
country to recognize the present National Government in 
China and it did so precisely on the basis that the Chiang 
Kai-shek regime, more than any other group, showed signs of 
being able to establish and maintain political unity. Aside, 
therefore, from the question of what our policy ought to be, 
the support of "complete unity" is in keeping with American 
to Text in Far Eastern Survey, August 1.1, 194cS. 
u Text in Amerasia, September 1943. 
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Far Eastern tradition and is the policy most likely to be main-
tained. 
(2) The strengthening of democracy. 
Sun Yat-sen stated that China should go through three 
stages of evolution: the first to consist of pacification of the 
country under military control; the second to serve as a period 
of "political tutelage" to prepare the Chinese people for self-
government; the third to establish constitutionalism. Since 
the end of the revolution in 1928, China has been living in the 
stage of "political tutelage." Running parallel to the structure 
of the government (which consists of such bodies as legisla-
tive, executive, judicial, examination and control yuans) is 
the elaborate organization of the Kuomintang Party that ex-
tends all the way from powerful central committees at the top, 
through provincial councils, to small local units. Moreover, 
the func tions of the Government and the Kuomintang are 
closely interwoven. 
Since the early 1930's China has been moving gradually 
toward the third or constitutional stage of its political develop-
ment. A constitution was drafted and published in 1936 and 
plans were made and set in motion for the calling of a con-
stitutional assembly. The convening of the assembly, how-
ever, was interrupted by the Sino-Japanese War. Recently 
the issue has come to the fore again with the announcement 
by the Government that a congress will be held to adopt the 
constitution within a year after the war. 
This declaration of the Government's has been widely 
acclaimed, both in China and in other countries, as a demo-
cratic step and an important move forward in the history of 
China. Some criticisms are, however, levelled against certain 
features of the draft constitution, such as the fact that the 
legislature is to meet only every three years, and will consist 
of over 2,000 members, regarded as an unwieldly number. 
Also, there are many who consider that the organization and 
membership of the constitutional assembly- which was deter-
mined in pre-war days-should be altered as they are said no 
longer to represent political conditions in China. 
In addition, there are those who, while welcoming the con-
stitution, feel that the gains which can be made through 
changes in the structure of any government are limited. De-
mocracy, they say, is not a matter of decrees but has its roots 
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deep in the conditions of the people. Until economic-and 
especially agrarian- reforms are effected in China, they believe 
that democracy cannot be truly vigorous. 
The question remains as to what effect the war has had 
on the democratic movement in China. Many think that 
significant progress has been made, not only through the ad-
vance toward a constitution but also by means of such meas-
ures as the establishment of the People's Political Council, 
which was created in 1938 and is the most popularly consti-
tuted of China's governing bodies. Others, however, feel that 
the tendency during the war-ascribed partly to the fact 
that China has been cut off from her more progressive and 
modernized eastern areas-has lain in the direction of 
strengthening the conservative groups in the country. An 
indication of this, they declare, is to be found in the strict 
controls imposed by the Government, especially within the 
last years. Pearl Buck states, for example, that "the great 
liberal forces of the recent past in China are growing 
silent. . . . There is now no real freedom of the press in 
China, no real freedom of speech."12 
In another article,13 published in Asia and The Americas last 
November, entitled Post-War China and the United States, 
Pearl Buck sets forth the thesis that the course of democracy 
in post-war China may depend to a large extent on the atti-
tude of the United States. The winning of the war will in 
itself, she says, strengthen democracy everywhere but this 
is not enough; the freedom of peoples is not won by military 
victories but "bit by bit in every nation." The essential 
question, she believes, is whether the United States will "decide 
for domination and empire" after the war or follow its "own 
genius in friendly relations with all". Only in the latter case 
she thinks will the people in Asia-and elsewhere-"breathe 
more freely and move more slowly", thus making possible the 
sound development of their own national life. 
,. Life, llfay 10, 1948. 
ts "Post· War China and the United States," Asia and the Americo.r1 November, 1943. 
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RECAPITULATION OF QUESTIONS 
1. What is China likely to want from the peace settlement 
as regards treatment of Japan? To what extent should 
the United States join with China in her demands as 
regards 
a. Territorial settlement 
b. Reform of the Japanese Government 
c. Disarmament of Japan 
d. Reparations 
2. What role should the United States play in China's post-
war industrialization? 
a. What stake has the United States in the post-war 
industrialization of China? 
b. On what terms should the United States participate in 
Chinese post-war industrialization? 
(1) Loans 
( 2) Foreign enterprise in China 
c. What form should China's post-war industrialization 
take and how is this related to United States interest 
and policy? 
( 1) Heavy vs. light industry? 
( 2) Government vs. private enterprise? 
(3) What is the interest of the United States? 
3. How should the United States shape her policies toward 
China in the political sphere? 
a. What problems are likely to arise in carrying out the 
policy of dealing with China as a "great" Power? 
How should the United States meet these problems? 
b. What policy should the United States adopt toward the 
problems which may confront post-war China in rela-
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